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PRACTICAL EVALUATION OF A REFERENCE ARCHITEC-
TURE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF PRIVACY LEVEL 
AGREEMENTS 
V. Diamantopoulou, H. Mouratidis 
Abstract 
With the enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation, any entity seeking compliance to spe-
cific privacy- and security-related requirements, the adoption of Privacy by Design and Security by 
Design principles can be considered as a legal obligation for any such entity processing EU citizens’ 
personal data. A formal way to support Data Controllers towards their compliance to the new Regula-
tion could be the use of a Privacy Level Agreement (PLA), a mutual agreement of the privacy settings 
between a Data Controller and a Data Subject, that supports privacy management, by analysing privacy 
threats, vulnerabilities and Information Systems’ trust relationships. However, the concept of PLA has 
only been proposed on a theoretical level. In this paper, we propose a novel reference architecture to 
enable PLA management in practice, and we report on the application and evaluation of PLA manage-
ment. To this aim, two different domains have been selected acting as real-life case studies, the public 
administration and the healthcare, where special categories of personal data is processed. The results 
of this evaluation are rather positive, indicating that the adoption of such an agreement promotes the 
transparency of an organisation while enhances Data Subjects’ trust. 
Keywords: Privacy Level Agreement, Security Requirements Engineering, Privacy Requirements Engi-
neering, Practical Evaluation. 
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1 Introduction 
Globally, Public Authorities and private organisations offer an increasing number of e-services to indi-
viduals (i.e. service consumers, citizens, patients). As a result, Information Systems (IS) are developed 
for different areas of e-services (e.g., healthcare, registration services), they operate in a way that sup-
ports governmental and industrial initiatives aiming to provide cheaper, faster and more democratic  
public services (Homburg, 2008), improving transparency of service consumers’ data sharing. However, 
in the development process of such IS, authorities face important challenges related to the privacy of 
individuals’ data (Loader, 2003). This is becoming even more important with the enforcement of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that requires compliance to specific privacy- and security-
related principles. Within the context of this Regulation, organisations that provide e-services or keep 
personal data, are known as Data Controllers (and Data Processors, but for simplicity reasons throughout 
the paper we are using the term ‘Data Controllers’), while those receiving e-services and having the 
ownership of the data are the Data Subjects. Data Controllers determine the purposes and the means of 
processing of the personal data they manage, while Data Processors process personal data on behalf of 
the Data Controllers (GDPR/Art. 4). Both Data Controllers and Data Processors are accountable for 
managing the personal data they possess in a way that they respect the privacy of the Data Subjects. The 
GDPR defines clear obligations and responsibilities for the Data Controllers and Data Processors 
(GDPR/Art.24, Art.28). In this context, it is important that Data Controllers, through their IS, are able 
to clearly specify Data Subjects’ privacy needs, provide them with feedback on how their data is shared 
and inform them of potential data privacy conflicts. Moreover, Data Controllers should enable Data 
Subjects to understand potential threats and vulnerabilities to their privacy requirements, as well as trust 
relationships that might endanger their privacy. It has been argued in the literature (Diamantopoulou et 
al., 2017; Diamantopoulou et al., 2017b; Cloud Security Alliance, Privacy Level Agreement Working 
Group, 2013) that such challenges can be addressed through the use of a Privacy Level Agreement 
(PLA), which supports a mutual agreement between a Data Controller and a Data Subject, regarding the 
Data Subject’s privacy needs and the transparency of their data sharing. 
In the context of cloud services, in order to facilitate the satisfaction of a client’s privacy requirements, 
the notion of PLA has been used (Cloud Security Alliance, Privacy Level Agreement Working Group, 
2013; Ahmadian et al., 2015) as part of a Service Level Agreement (SLA) (Bouman et al., 1999; Keller 
and Ludwig, 2003) as a bilateral agreement between cloud service providers and their clients on how 
and to what degree the data of the latter should be protected. In the area of IS engineering, we have 
presented in previous work (omitted reference for the review) a language that supports the modelling of 
PLAs for Data Controllers’ IS services and a theoretical analysis of how the PLA can be used to support 
implementation of a schema towards the GDPR compliance (omitted reference for the review).  
In this paper, we build on our previous work, and we make the following contributions: First, we propose 
a reference architecture for PLA management, both at design time and during runtime. This is important 
because it allows the creation of PLAs as digital contracts, between Data Subjects and Data Controllers, 
which can by analysed at design time and used at runtime to guarantee that the Data Subjects’ privacy 
is respected, based on their privacy preferences. Next, we perform an empirical evaluation across two 
domains (public administration and health care), which is focused on evaluating the applicability of the 
PLA and on the identification of potential benefits and difficulties raised from its usage. This is the first 
effort in the literature to practically evaluate PLAs in the context of Information Systems (IS) services. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 discuses related work, while Section 3 pre-
sents a brief overview of the PLA structure and introduces the reference architecture. Section 4 illustrates 
the application of our work on case studies from the Public Administration and Healthcare domains, and 
Section 5 evaluates the results of this. Finally, Section 6 summarises the conclusions and raises issues 
for further research. 
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2 Related Work 
Conceptually, the proposed architecture consists of two distinct parts, the managerial one and the adap-
tation of security and privacy requirements engineering methodologies. In order to realise the im-
portance and the novelty of the proposed architecture, the related work consists of two parts; the first is 
related with the management of the security and privacy requirements of individuals and the second 
focuses on the methodologies capturing such requirements. 
2.1 Management of security and privacy requirements  
The term of the Privacy Level Agreement is not a new one. The Privacy Level Agreement Working 
Group of the Cloud Security Alliance has defined a PLA in the context of cloud services (Cloud Security 
Alliance, Privacy Level Agreement Working Group, 2013). Similarly, the concept of PLA has been 
presented by DErrico and Pearson (2015) as a standardised way for cloud providers to describe their 
data protection practices. In the same way to the Cloud Security Alliance proposal, this work focuses on 
the cloud environment and the PLA is considered as a means for the cloud providers to ensure that their 
privacy policy is communicated to the service consumers. However, these works are limited only to the 
examination of privacy aspects of cloud provision and do not provide support for specification of user 
(e.g., citizen) preferences and needs or ways to define privacy threats and vulnerabilities related to these 
needs, important aspects of the PLA of this work. 
A study of Ahmadian et al., (2015) presents a tool-based approach that facilitates the ISO27001 certifi-
cation process for cloud service providers, appropriate for SMEs. The authors present the ClouDAT 
framework, a cloud-specific risk assessment process that allows the automatic generation of ISO27001 
compliant documentation, based on the outcomes of the risk assessment. The PLA is used as an input to 
their tool in order to perform security checks. Compared to our work, this framework focuses on the 
security analysis on cloud environment, with little emphasis on privacy requirements been given. Also, 
this approach does not support Data Subjects (e.g., citizens, patients) specifying their privacy prefer-
ences and needs. 
The idea of a standardised way for web sites to communicate with users about their privacy policies in 
a standard machine-readable format has been introduced by the Platform of Privacy Preferences (P3P) 
Project (Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, 2016). This standard enables web browsers and 
other user agents to interpret privacy policies on behalf of their users, assisting them to decide when 
they exchange data with web sites. However, P3P was designed for static environments where users’ 
privacy preferences are not expected to change, and it also provides limited support for specification of 
privacy threats and vulnerabilities that might endanger the privacy needs.  
A study of Drogkaris et al., (2013) proposes an architecture that promotes the employment of privacy 
policies and preferences. The authors introduce the Privacy Controller Agent for storing and comparing 
service providers’ privacy policies and user privacy preferences. However, this work does not provide 
an agreement between two entities (e.g., PA and citizens) but rather an architecture to define privacy 
policies. 
On the other hand, the literature provides many examples of works that focus on the specification of 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) which refer to the mutual agreement that defines the obligations and 
the requirements both of a service provider and a customer (e.g., Bouman et al., 1999; Keller and Lud-
wig, 2003; García et al., 2017; Mohamed et al., 2017). In contrast to the PLA concept, an SLA does not 
take into account privacy aspects of the agreement between a service provider and a service consumer. 
Consequently, the proposed architecture for the establishment of a PLA, either in an already existing 
system or in a new one, differs from the solutions analysed above. The proposed architecture takes into 
consideration the requirements of the natural persons (under the examined scope), providing thus the 
ability for the development of a personalised agreement between the data controller and the data subject. 
Moreover, the proposed solution is a dynamic one, allowing updates when necessary, either by the Data 
Controller or by the Data Subject. Finally, most of the existing solutions do not pay enough focus on the 
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privacy requirements, creating thus a gap in the completeness of the provided system from the perspec-
tive of the satisfaction of requirements imposed by the GDPR. 
We have also contributed to the state-of-the-art by formally specifying the concept of the PLA, based 
on an XML schema, which enables its automated use (omitted reference for the review). In addition, we 
have extended our work (omitted reference for the review) so the PLA can be used to support the GDPR, 
providing the metamodel of the PLA. Finally, an application of the PLA in healthcare domain is pre-
sented in (omitted reference for the review), focusing mainly on the functionalities of the PLA manage-
ment platform. 
2.2 Security and privacy requirements methodologies  
Various approaches have been proposed in the literature for systematically capturing security and pri-
vacy requirements. In the area of privacy requirements, the Privacy Safeguard (PriS) (Kalloniatis et al., 
2008) methodology enables the elicitation of privacy requirements in the software design phase, where 
privacy requirements are modelled as organisational goals. Next, in (Spiekermann and Cranor, 2009) 
the authors adopt the concepts of privacy-by-policy and privacy-by-architecture, and propose a three-
sphere model of user privacy concerns, relating it to system operations (i.e. data transfer, storage and 
processing). Additionally, the Modelling and Analysis of Privacy-aware Systems (MAPaS) framework 
(Colombo and Ferrari, 2012) is a framework for modelling requirements for privacy-aware systems. In 
(Deng et al., 2011) the authors present LINDDUN, a privacy threat analysis framework which, in its 
first release, aimed at the elicitation and fulfilment of privacy requirements in software-based systems. 
The process that LINDDUN follows is that a data flow diagram (DFD) of the system is designed and 
then the identified privacy threats are related to DFD elements. Privacy threat trees and misuse cases are 
used for the collection of threat scenarios that might affect the system. Moreover, this methodology 
supports the elicitation of the final privacy requirements and the selection of appropriate privacy en-
hancing technologies. The final stage of this methodology is the prioritisation and validation of privacy 
threats through risk assessment. LINDDUN also provides a map that connects privacy enhancing tech-
nologies with each privacy requirement, facilitating thus the system designers to select the most appro-
priate techniques that are able to satisfy privacy requirements. 
Regarding security requirements methodologies, literature provides numerous works that have been de-
veloped. Indicatively, we present SQUARE (Security Quality Requirements Engineering) methodology 
(Mead and Stehney, 2005) which is a risk-driven method that supports the elicitation, categorisation, 
prioritisation and inspection of the security requirements through a number of specific steps. It also 
supports the performance of risk assessment to verify the tolerance of a system against possible threats. 
Nexrt in (Faßbender et al., 2014a,b) the authors propose the Problem-based Security Requirements Elic-
itation (PresSuRE) Methodology that facilitates the identification of security needs during requirements 
analysis of software systems, providing a computer security threat recognition and then the development 
of security requirements. Ahmed and Matulevicius (2014) introduced an asset-based approach for the 
elicitation of security goals from business process models which are then translated into security re-
quirements. This method follows a sequence of steps. During the first step, an early analysis is performed 
that identifies the business assets that are valuable and must be protected against security risks. The 
second step is dedicated to the elicitation of security requirements during the examination of the security 
risk of business assets. The final stage is the elicitation of security requirements which results to the 
generation of business rules that satisfy security goals of the system under examination. In (Salini and 
Kanmani, 2013) the authors propose Model Oriented Security Requirements Engineering (MOSRE) 
framework for Web Applications which considers security requirements at the early stages of the devel-
opment process, covering all phases of requirements engineering and suggesting the specification of the 
security requirements in addition to the specification of systems requirements. Differently than these 
works, our study provides a start-to-end implementation of a security and privacy management approach 
that takes into account the PbD principles, starting with the elicitation of the user privacy needs and  
ending with the provision of PA online services, and the security by design principles, by conducting 
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security analysis of the IS of the service provider, allowing the detection of threats and facilitating the 
selection of suitable security mechanisms to mitigate potential attacks. 
Considering the two areas analysed above, the proposed architecture presents a holistic flow of actions, 
which incorporates the elicitation of security and privacy requirements engineering methodologies in 
order to provide a clear view of the examined system, as well as to provide a dynamic interaction allow-
ing the re-identification of the PLA, when necessary. 
3 Reference Architecture for Privacy Level Agreements Man-
agement 
In the context of this work, we define a PLA as the mutual agreement of the privacy settings between a 
Data Controller (i.e. Public Administration (PA)) and a Data Subject (i.e. citizen), where the former will 
commit to provide and maintain these settings throughout the provision of the service. The PLA, which 
embodies the privacy policy that must be applied, is delivered in a form of a structured agreement that 
consists of fields, each of them capturing important and obligatory information with regards to privacy 
of Data Subjects’ data. Moreover, an XML schema has been proposed (omitted reference for the review) 
to enable the creation and management of machine-readable PLAs, allowing its utilisation by diverse/ag-
nostic IS, thus addressing interoperability issues. The XML schema enables automated processing of 
the information included in the PLA, for every entity understanding this schema. In this section, we 
present an overview of the PLA structure, as proposed in (omitted reference for the review) to support 
understanding of the rest of the paper. We then describe the proposed reference architecture for PLA 
management, across two levels: Design Time and Runtime. In briefly, at design time we meet the re-
quirements’ specifications and the generation of the PLA and at runtime the PLA enforcement is exe-
cuted. Detailed analysis on this follows is sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. 
3.1 Brief Overview of PLA structure 
The structure of the PLA contains two sections, the first with information related to the Data Controller 
and the second to the Data Subject. In turn, each section contains a number of fields that include infor-
mation related to the privacy of the Data Subjects’ data. Most of the fields are associated with require-
ments of the GDPR (omitted reference for the review) in order to demonstrate their necessity and their 
appropriateness. Remaining fields relate to the information flow between the Data Controller and the 
Data Subject. It is worth mentioning in this point that the responsible role, from the Data Controller’s 
side, should be the Data Protection Officer (DPO). The Data Controller’s PLA section can and is pro-
posed to be supported by the appointed DPO. This way, the DPO will have the responsibility related to 
the completion of all the necessary actions described below, for creating and maintaining the PLA. 
However, in the architecture presented below, a DPO actor is not explicitly depicted, for generality 
purposes, as not all the Data Controllers are obliged to appoint a DPO. It can be considered that in the 
proposed architecture the DPO (or corresponding role) is managing all the described processes.    
Data Controller Section The field Identity presents the contact details of the Data Controller and the 
responsible administrator, i.e. name, place of establishment. The field Data specifies which personal 
data the Data Subject needs to provide to the Data Controller. Next, the field Data Processing Ways 
provides information about processing and storing Data Subjects’ data. The field Data Sharing Prefer-
ences contains information about third parties that can have access to Data Subjects’ data. The field 
Data Privacy Measures specifies the technical, physical, and organisational measures in place to protect 
Data Subjects’ personal data against any destruction or loss, alteration, unauthorised use, modification, 
disclosure of access, and any other unlawful form of processing. The field Privacy Threat Analysis 
provides the threat analysis of the Data Controller’s privacy requirements. The field Trust Analysis ac-
cordingly, provides the trust analysis of the Data Controller’s privacy requirements. Last, the field Law 
Compliance gives information on whether privacy requirements are compliant with corresponding pri-
vacy national or EU laws and regulations. 
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Data Subject Section The field National Public Authority contains the necessary details of the Author-
ity responsible for protecting Data Subjects’ personal data rights. The field Data Subject Privacy Pref-
erences has the privacy preferences of the Data Subject that have been collected by the Data Controller. 
The field History Based Assessment consists of an analysis of the Data Subjects’ privacy preferences 
and the generation of a prediction of the possible outcomes of subsequent requests. Last, the field Data 
Value contains the average of i) the Data Subject’s perspective concerning their data, ii) the valuation 
that the Data Controller provides, and iii) the average valuation of all the Data Subjects. 
3.2 Privacy Level Agreement at Design Time 
The IS of a Data Controller which offers e-services has to be set up in a way to facilitate the management 
of the PLA. To this end, the Data Controller uses appropriate methods and tools that will enable them 
to capture the relevant information during the design time of the system-to-be. A reference architecture 
that implements the relevant process during the design time is depicted in Figure 1. 
The Data Subject who wishes to use the Data Controller’s e-service has to provide only the necessary 
data for the provision of the e-service. This data is then stored to the Data Controller database. Once 
the data is captured, the Data Controller needs to specify their processing rights, representing the purpose 
for which the data is collected (GDPR/Art. 5). So, the Data Controller captures their Privacy Require-
ments. This can be achieved by any method and tool available in the literature. 
 
Figure 1. Reference Architecture for PLA Management 
Furthermore, the relevant laws and regulations at a national and international level are encoded and 
stored to the Privacy Law Repository. Compliance of the privacy requirements with such laws and reg-
ulations has to be checked and verified by the Law Compliance Checker. The latter collects i) the spec-
ified privacy requirements and ii) the relevant laws, in order to shape the final privacy requirements. 
This part regards the specification of how Data Controllers manage and use the personal data of Data 
Subjects and the specification of constraints imposed by national, European, or international legislation. 
Also, at this stage, the Data Controller proceeds to a valuation of the collected Data Subjects’ data in 
order to provide this information later in the PLA. 
Next, a Data Controller’s Security Engineer conducts a security analysis of the system under examina-
tion. The output of this analysis is a threat model that depicts the potential threats that can exploit system 
vulnerabilities and cause privacy breaches. These threats can be mitigated by identifying additional 
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Security and Privacy Measures. Furthermore, the aforementioned analysis can be used for the specifi-
cation of an appropriate system architecture that has to be developed by the Security Engineer along 
with an examination that this architecture does not violate the privacy requirements. 
Finally, the last activity of the Data Controller during the design time is to define the questions of the 
questionnaire which will be used by the Questionnaire Composer. These questions are related with the 
identification of the entities that are allowed to have access to the personal data, with the corresponding 
services that this data will be associated with, and with the definition of the period that the data will be 
stored for (when this period is not being determined by the legislation). After the Questionnaire Com-
poser has received this information, the Questionnaire is composed and released. After the questionnaire 
has been released, the Data Subject is requested to fill it in, stating their privacy preferences and provid-
ing their own assessment, revealing their perception about the value of their personal data. The com-
pleted questionnaire is then collected by the PLA Manager which generates the PLA, stores it to the 
Data Controller Database and displays it to the Data Subject. The PLA is provided to the Data Subject 
either in a pdf form or via a web URL. 
3.3 Privacy Level Agreement at Runtime 
The relevant information during runtime is also depicted in Figure 1. Once the IS of the Data Controller 
is implemented and put in operation, the Data Subject can register to the system in order to use its e-
services. At this point, the PLA between the Data Subject and the Data Controller is generated, since all 
the relevant information has been captured. To support the PLA generation, we have defined an XML 
schema1 which supports machine-readable analysis (omitted reference for the review). 
Access to Data Subject’s data will depend on the individual PLA of the Data Subject. Every time a 
Third-Party Organisation is requesting access to the Data Subject data, the request is received by the 
Privacy Enforcer. The protection of the privacy of the citizens’ data is achieved by respecting privacy 
policies, using as basis the privacy preferences defined by the citizens. The privacy enforcer parses the 
policies defined by the Data Subject’s answers, and according to them, the requests are either allowed 
or denied. These requests are then sent to the PLA manager, creating History Assessment information 
which captures the ratio of allowed/denied requests of Data Subjects’ data. This ratio is then depicted in 
the PLA, keeping Data Subjects updated regarding the level of openness of their data. This information 
is also useful to the Data Controllers in order to revise their security architecture of their IS. 
The PLA is a dynamic document which is continuously updated. These updates can be triggered because 
of any alteration that the Data Subject wishes to make regarding their privacy preferences, or because 
of the aggregation of the results of the value assessment other Data Subjects have provided, or because 
of the privacy enforcer’s results regarding the allowed/denied requests of Data Subject’s data. Finally, 
on the Data Controller’s side, the PLA can also change because of a change to the architecture of the IS, 
which might be a result of a business activity (e.g., collaboration with another organisation, delivery of 
a new or an extended e-service, etc.).  
4 Case Study 
The aim of this section is to illustrate the applicability of the PLA and to identify potential benefits and 
difficulties by its adoption. In order to have objective results, we evaluate the application of the PLA 
management at real case studies of two different pilots, run in the following two domains: Public Ad-
ministration and Healthcare domain. The challenge that these domains have to face is that their online 
administration services lack the trust of end-users (European Commission, 2015; Bouckaert, 2012). This 
study aims to reveal potential difficulties found in these domains in the adoption and use of e-services. 
Additionally, with these case studies, this work will demonstrate the advantages of the adoption of the 
PLA, both on the Data Controllers’ and the Data Subjects’ side. We analysed two different domains, 
 
1 http://www.sense-brighton.eu/xml_pla/ 
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with different scenarios, trying to achieve a holistic case study (Zainal, 2007), by evaluating the overall 
proposed architecture and by analysing two applicable scenarios in these two different domains. 
4.1 Public Administration domain 
The first pilot examines the applicability of the PLA in the context of a governmental IS. A local PA, 
the Municipality of Athens (MoA), provides e-government services, using an IS that stores and manages 
personal data of Athenian citizens, namely MACS (Municipality of Athens Computer Services). The 
main purpose of MACS is to interconnect with collaborative to MoA organisations, such as hospitals, 
banks, sport facilities, and many others, and also to store and transmit information necessary for the 
completion of a citizen’s request (e.g., the issue of a birth certificate) without requiring a citizen’s phys-
ical presence. 
Although MACS supports multiple e-services, for simplicity reasons, we focus on the e-service related 
to a citizen’s subscription to a local fitness centre. MoA offers 15% discount to Athenian citizens, i.e. 
the ones who can prove that they permanently live in the city of Athens. As proof of their locality, 
citizens are required to provide their birth certificate, issued by MoA. An Athenian citizen requests the 
issue of their birth certificate using the MACS system, which directly transmits the required information 
to the IS of the fitness centre, as part of the e-government services in MoA. It is also required that the 
citizen provides a medical certificate regarding their health condition, especially if they suffer from any 
heart disorders or to prove that they do not have any skin condition. The citizen has to visit their physi-
cian in order to be provided with this certificate. If the citizen has recently received a medical certificate, 
MACS is able to retrieve it from the hospital’s database and, with the consent of the citizen, to forward 
it to the IS of the fitness centre. In this scenario, the MACS will handle the birth- and the medical 
certificate of a citizen. Based on the one-stop concept (Tambouris and Wimmer, 2008; Sedek et al., 
2011), i.e. sharing information across multiple IS belonging to different governmental authorities and 
organisations, the MACS is interconnected with both other PAs and service providers, so the citizen has 
to provide their privacy preferences regarding the information that they wish to share and how. Moreo-
ver, the administrators of MoA must ensure transparency of the data sharing process with other organi-
sations, thus minimising any reluctance of citizens in sharing their personal data, and eventually in using 
e-services of MoA through MACS. In order for citizens to take the right decision regarding the sharing 
of their data, they should be aware of i) the relevant mechanisms MoA administrators apply to their IS 
in order to protect citizens privacy, and ii) the value of their data. 
4.2 Healthcare domain 
The second pilot, from the healthcare domain, provides different challenges since it involves cross-
border exchange of medical data, which is of more sensitive nature, and also there are emergency cases 
where the Data Subject (i.e. patient) is not able to get involved in the process of the provision of consent.  
This pilot involves two paediatric clinics, namely Ospedale Pediatrico Bambino Gesù (OPBG) and Hos-
pital Infantil Universitario Niño Jesús (HIUNJ), from two different countries, Italy and Spain, respec-
tively. These clinics use a telemedicine platform to exchange medical information of patients. The pro-
cesses in telemedicine services fall within the sensitive data being processed by electronic instruments, 
which are currently regulated by the provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC (European Commission: Di-
rective 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2002). The methods and the solu-
tions necessary to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of data should therefore be adopted 
in accordance with the security measures explicitly provided in the Directive 95/46/EC (European Com-
mission: Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 1995), covered under the 
GDPR (European Parliament: Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regula-
tion, 2016)) and the new regulation replacing the Directive 2002/58/EC, which can be found in (Euro-
pean Commission: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2012). In 
our scenario, an Italian patient suffers from a disease which is characterised by doctors as quite rare and 
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complex enough. The physicians who provide health care to the patient, decide to discuss this case with 
a specialist group in another hospital, HIUNJ, in Spain. Due to several circumstances, it is impossible 
for the physicians of the two countries to arrange a meeting with physical presence. Thus, tele-consul-
tation is arranged in order for the physicians to decide the most appropriate diagnostic procedures and 
therapy. The physicians at OPBG conduct their diagnosis, and they produce a medical report which is 
accompanied with medical images of the patient. This data is retrieved by the specialised group at 
HIUNJ via an OPBG web application. After the HIUNJ have received the necessary data, they are able 
to provide their assessment for the case, confirming whether the first diagnosis is correct or not. 
4.3 Privacy Level Agreement Management in the case of the MoA 
The process of the PLA management that is followed is the same in both case studies. For simplicity 
reasons, in this work we demonstrate, in the rest of this section, only the application of our work on the 
PA pilot, although we discuss in Section 5 the evaluation of the work on both cases.  
To support the management of PLAs both at design and runtime levels, as discussed in Section 3, Data 
Controllers need to make use of appropriate tools and techniques to capture the organisational structure 
of their system and perform privacy, security and trust analysis. Although the selection of such tools 
and techniques depends on each organisation, the MoA pilot made used of tools developed as part of 
the VisiOn EU project (VisiOn Privacy Platform, 2016) platform.  
Design time. At the design level, three main activities are performed that form input to the PLA, as 
described in Section 3. In particular, the Questionnaire Creation, the law compliance checks and the 
privacy and threat analysis. In the MoA pilot, to provide input to the PLA from the privacy and threat 
analysis, MoA Security Engineers modelled privacy requirements (Gharib et al., 2016) of their MACS 
system, using the STS modelling language (Salnitri et al., 2015) of the VisiOn platform. Based on that 
analysis, business processes were designed, using the SecBPMN2 tool (Salnitri et al., 2016), that are 
implemented by the MACS IS, capturing also any identified interaction with other systems. For exam-
ple, the activity Allow access was modelled, in order to provide permission for reading the medical 
certificate and storing it in the local database, allowing citizens to access the fitness centre’s IS. 
Then, the MoA Security Engineers made use of the SecTro tool, a modelling tool supporting the analysis 
and consideration of security, from the early stages of the development process (Mouratidis et al., 2016) 
to enrich the STS-ml model with privacy and security requirements and relevant privacy objectives. As 
an example, through that analysis, it was identified that the MACS privacy constraint regarding access 
to medical certificate can be satisfied through the undetectability privacy objective.  
Privacy mechanisms stored in a library of the tool which has been enhanced with privacy patterns (Di-
amantopoulou et al., 2017c) These patterns are used to identify appropriate privacy solutions, such as 
smart cards and permission management. The results of this analysis were then used as input in the 
corresponding field of the PLA, indicating the specific privacy and security mechanisms that MoA has 
to use, assuring the citizen of the level of their privacy protection, thus increasing their trust in MoA e-
services.  
Next, the MoA Security Engineers constructed a trust model using the JTrust tool (Pavlidis et al., 2014) 
in order to identify dependencies among the system’s stakeholders. In the context of sociotechnical 
systems, four types have been identified; the first type is the experiential trust and originates from pre-
vious experience that one entity gains from the interaction of another entity; the second type is the re-
ported trust, which emerges from a third party that reports that an entity is trustworthy; the third type of 
trust is the normative trust, which originates from the norms established by the system environment 
(e.g., a law or a regulation that enforce an entity to fulfil its goal); the fourth type of trust is the external 
trust, which emerges from external origins, outside the environment of the examined system, such as 
governments, supervisory and any other authorities. In our case, the citizen depends on the IS of the 
fitness centre to keep their medical certificate confidential. This dependency implies a trust relationship 
between the citizen and the IS of the fitness centre and is justified with Reported Trust, i.e. MoA reports 
that the IS of the fitness centre can be trusted to keep the medical certificate confidential. It is worth 
noting that in cases where this analysis reports lack of trust, control mechanisms are added. 
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After that, Security Engineers added security annotations on the model of the system’s architecture. The 
CARiSMA tool (Jürjens, 2002) is used for the design of the models by using UMLsec, and performs 
checks to validate that the architecture satisfies the security requirements. In our scenario, the transmis-
sion of a document by the MACS to the IS of the fitness centre was annotated with the security require-
ment of confidentiality. There, a transmission annotation was added to both actors, to verify that the 
checks performed by the tools are successful. This ensures the implementation of all the necessary se-
curity measures that guarantee the protection of citizens’ data. 
The last part of the analysis that MoA Security Engineers conducted was compliance with the relevant 
laws and regulations, at national and European level, to prove to citizens that they are compliant to the 
law. For the MoA pilot, the LIONoso tool (Battiti and Brunato, 2014) was used as the law compliance 
checker to i) specify how MoA uses/manages citizen’s data; ii) specify the constraints imposed by laws 
and regulations and iii) verify compliance of the data management specified by MoA with the constraints 
specified in the aforementioned specification of laws and regulations. MoA Security Engineers inserted, 
in a machine-readable format, the relevant national and EU privacy laws related to the privacy preser-
vation of personal and sensitive data. Then, they specified the operations that are applied over this data, 
e.g., MoA produces birth certificate. Finally, MoA Security Engineers used the Data Value Tool (DVT) 
of the VisiOn platform to assess citizen’s personal data. This value was then compared with both MoA 
expectations and citizen’s perspective, and the results are visualised to the users through the PLA.  
When MoA Security Engineers completed the aforementioned analysis, they proceeded with the crea-
tion of an appropriate, privacy related, questionnaires so that the Data Subjects (in our case, citizens) 
using the MoA services could define their privacy preferences. For the MoA pilot, the Dynamic Audit 
Engine (DAE) tool of the VisiOn platform played the role of the questionnaire composer, assisting MoA 
in easily creating questionnaires. Once the citizen registered to the MoA e-service, they had to answer 
this questionnaire. The answers to those questionnaires formed the last input to the PLA.  
Runtime. This phase regards the enforcement of the PLA. The preferences of the citizen, as they have 
been recorded in the PLA, are parsed by the Privacy Enforcer. In the pilot described in this case, two 
tools were used, namely the Privacy Agreement Enforcer (PAE) and the Media Aware Network Element 
(MANE). PAE tool is responsible for creating privacy policies which are formulated by the privacy 
preferences defined by citizens, after they filled in the questionnaire. Moreover, PAE evaluates requests 
for accessing private data against these policies, checking the policies that apply to that specific data 
and enforces the results. MANE is responsible for monitoring and filtering network traffic, acting as a 
second layer of data protection by applying access rules according to the data received from PAE. In 
case that we have a request by a third-party organisation to gain access to a citizen’s personal data, PAE 
receives this request and checks if this activity is allowed, according to the generated PLA (which con-
tains citizen’s privacy preferences). If the citizen has denied MoA the right to share their personal data 
e.g., for commercial purposes, MoA applies this policy. The result of PAE is then forwarded to MANE 
which automatically stops future requests to this specific information. Also, a notification (e.g., via 
SMS) about the attempts to access their data and the corresponding results is sent to the citizen. In this 
way, the citizen is continuously updated, and this positively affects their trust in MoA e-services. Finally, 
the results of the actions of both PAE and MANE are forwarded to LIONoso, which has already been 
described in the design time. LIONoso updates the number of requests to citizen’s data, thus formulating 
a history-based assessment percentage. 
5 Evaluation 
This section aims to evaluate the usefulness of the PLA and to provide insights about its applicability. 
This evaluation has been conducted under two perspectives. On the one hand, at a technical level, we 
assess PLA’s usability and potential challenges that the end users came across during its management. 
On the other hand, from a social point of view, we evaluate the PLA management reference architecture 
regarding the impact, for both Data Controllers and Data Subjects, on the protection of their personal 
data and the level of trust of Data Subjects to Data Controllers during the provision of their data.  
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5.1 Evaluation Method 
PLA management is achieved through the use of a series of tools, each one responsible for a specific 
part of it. More specifically, the tools that are necessary and contribute to the management of the PLA, 
during the design time i) conduct privacy analysis on Data Controllers’ IS, by analysing threats, vulner-
abilities, and trust relationships of their IS with other ones, ii) create the questionnaire that allows Data 
Subjects to provide/declare their privacy preferences, iii) allow the assessment of the value of Data 
Subjects’ data, and, during runtime, they v) enforce and monitor Data Subjects’ privacy preferences. 
The management of the PLA is accompanied with a novel, quite technologically challenging solution. 
Such an approach can be either accepted or rejected by the end-users, according to their behaviour to-
wards the solution, after testing its use. For this reason, we decided to support the evaluation process 
based on the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989; Venkatesh and Davis, 2000). TAM 
approach is an information systems theory that models how users come to accept and use a technology. 
The model suggests that when users are presented with a new technology, a number of factors influence 
their decision on how and when they will use it. Notably, the approach introduces two determinants: i) 
Perceived Usefulness (PU), which is defined as “the degree to which a person believes that using a 
particular system would enhance their job performance”, and ii) Perceived Ease-Of-Use (PEOU), which 
is defined as “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would be free from 
effort”. Therefore, PU provides insight on how useful the technological approach behind PLA manage-
ment is, while PEOU on how easy it is to use. This evaluation method aims to include parameters that 
will quantify end-users’ perspective, on what extent the release of such technology is necessary and 
could cover their need. Furthermore, it will provide insights regarding the required effort that the end-
users have to employ to use the technological solution that supports the management of the PLA, since 
users tend to adopt technologies that not only are effective but can also be apprehended in an effortless 
way. 
5.2 Results 
For the two pilots, the means of the evaluation was an online survey, which was designed under the 
TAM approach, and took place between February and June 2017. The questions aim to mainly confirm 
the increased perception of trust in online public services, both for the Data Controllers and for Data 
Subjects. Thus, the end-users report the level of privacy on their personal data, so they validate their 
willingness to share data while feeling secure and protected from the adoption of the PLA in the corre-
sponding e-service.  
The first part of the questionnaire is common for both Data Controllers and Data Subjects, including 
additionally three demographic questions on sex, age, and education level. Next, there are questions 
solely for Data Controllers and solely for Data Subjects. The Public Administration questionnaire in-
cluded 18 questions for PAs and 20 for citizens, while the Healthcare questionnaire included 13 ques-
tions for the administrators and 18 for patients. The questionnaires were distinct for each of the two 
pilots as the case studies were different as well, i.e. the case study for the public administration domain 
describes an interaction taking place between a citizen and a public body, when the first wishes to use 
an online service offered by the later, while the case study for the healthcare domain describes a cross-
border exchange of medical data in an emergency situation. In addition, the nature of the exchanged 
data in these case studies is of different value (the scenario of the public administration domain focuses 
on personal data while the scenario of the healthcare domain focuses on special categories of personal 
data, i.e. health data, that requires different management). However, we present below, in Table 1 and 
Table 2, respectively, the questions that triggered significant statistical responses and results, and may 
offer valuable findings for this study. All questions are given in multiple choice format, with answers 
possible in the following 5-point Likert scale; totally disagree, disagree, neither agree/nor disagree, 
agree, totally agree. For simplicity reasons, we provide only the top three percentages per question. 
 
Criterion Question The Respondents: 
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PEU, Supportability Do you find that the process of the PLA 
management is designed for all levels of 
users, irrespective of their technical back-
ground? 
Agree 47,22%, Neither agree/nor 
disagree 30,56%, Disagree 18,06% 
PU, Reliability, Security Is PLA management platform useful for 
providing innovative services to Data 
Subjects, as far as privacy is concerned? 
Agree 62,50%, Totally agree 
22,22%, Neither agree/nor disagree 
15,28% 
PU, Reliability, Threat, 
Information Control 
Would PLA management platform im-
prove privacy in public services provided 
to Data Subjects? 
Agree 58,33%, Totally agree 
23,61%, Neither agree/nor disagree 
15,28% 
PU, Reliability Would PLA increase trust to public ser-
vices? 
Agree 51,39%, Totally agree 
25,00% 
Neither agree/nor disagree 22,22% 
PEOU, Perceived Ease of 
Learning 
Are you confident that you can complete a 
process for the management of a PLA? 
Agree 62,50%, Neither agree/nor 
disagree 22,22%, Totally agree 
09,72% 
Solely Administrators Questions 
PEOU, Supportability, 
Performance 
Is PLA management platform easy to inte-
grate with existing public services? 
Agree 43,24%, Neither agree/nor 
disagree 43,24%, Disagree 10,81% 
Platform requirements Does PLA management platform com-
municate securely with other public bod-
ies to execute the request? 
Agree 54,05%, Neither agree/nor 
disagree 29,73%, Totally agree 
13,51% 
Solely Citizens Questions 
PU, Information Control Would PLA make it easy to understand 
the actual values of our personal data? 
Agree 51,43%, Neither agree/nor 
disagree 20,00%, Disagree 17,14% 
Platform Requirements Does PLA assist Data Subjects regarding 
the preferred level of privacy? 
Agree 71,43%, Neither agree/nor 
disagree 20,00%, Totally agree 
08,57% 
PU Would you use PLA for public services? Agree 71,43%, Neither agree/nor 
disagree 17,14%, Disagree 08,57% 
Table 1. Questionnaire in Public Administration domain 
 
Criterion Question The Respondents: 
PEOU, Perceived Ease of 
Learning 
Is the PLA management platform easy to 
use? 
Agree 49,50%, Neither agree/nor 
disagree 25,80%, Totally agree 
23,70% 
PU, Reliability, Threat, In-
formation Control 
Before the simulation, did you know the 
privacy and security aspects of health 
data? 
Neutral 35,30%, Not really 34,20%, 
Somewhat 15,80% 
PU, Information Control, 
Reliability 
Do you think this process has raised your 
awareness of the privacy issues by 
providing you with greater awareness 
and understanding of the importance of 
protecting your data? 
Agree 46,30%, Neither agree/nor 
disagree 18,90%, Totally agree 
17,40% 
PU, Supportability Do you think that PLA management plat-
form can guarantee greater privacy and 
security while exchanging health data? 
Agree 44,20%, Totally agree 
30,50%, Neither agree/nor disagree 
15,80% 
Solely Patients Questions 
PU, Information Control Do you think PLA management platform 
allows patients greater control over 
Agree 49,50 %, Totally agree 
23,70%, Neither agree/nor disagree 
14,70% 
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privacy using constraints on health data 
transmission? 
PU, Information Control, 
Risks 
Do you think this process has made you 
aware of the potential risks or benefits of 
consciously compiling the consent for 
the transmission of health data? 
Agree 56,30%, Totally agree 
24,20%, Neither agree/nor disagree 
12,60% 
PEOU, Perceived Ease of 
Learning, Supportability 
Do you think this process can be useful 
for patients with particular clinical needs 
or problems, such as reduced mobility? 
Agree 42,10%, Totally agree 
31,10%, Neither agree/nor disagree 
18,40% 
 
PU, Information Control Do you think the PLA offers a complete 
insight on privacy and security issues? 
Agree 46,80%, Totally agree 
36,30%, Disagree 8,40% 
Table 2. Questionnaire in Healthcare domain 
The evaluation of the process regarding the generation of the PLA in the context of the presented case 
study followed a systematic approach, combining on one hand the objectives the users set, i.e. the im-
provement of users' privacy, the level of security, and their trust when they use PAs services, and on the 
other hand, the requirements related to the development of the PLA, using a series of tools. Each re-
quirement could be either technical, and therefore its fulfilment could be verified by checking the exist-
ence of the functionality(ies) implemented, or could refer to a human perspective, such as usability of 
the corresponding tools. The users evaluated the whole process of the identification of security, privacy, 
and trust requirements as easy, even though they were not familiar with such tools and methodologies 
at the start of the project. They mentioned some difficulties during their first interaction with the tools, 
the effort they put in order to integrate the VisiOn platform in their already existing platforms and sys-
tems, and in understanding the functionalities of each tool. However, they realised the importance of 
such a platform, that could support the services they deliver, as they can demonstrate they take into 
consideration citizens' privacy, by securing their sociotechnical systems, respecting the privacy require-
ments, and by analysing the trust relationships they have developed with external entities. Finally, a 
remarkable comment was that the users considered the proposed work as a method that could act as an 
additional trust layer between the existing services that the MoA provides to the citizens of Athens, 
acting as a facilitator between a public body and a citizen, increasing trust to offered public services. 
The following two paragraphs provide a thorough analysis of the results of the case studies for the public 
administration domain and for the healthcare one. 
Public Administration domain In this pilot, the sources for engaging participants – that had already 
been contacted and recruited during pilot preparation – derived from both private companies as well as 
in the public sector among the Municipality of Athens, other municipalities and bodies of local admin-
istration. The goal was to engage mainly participants that are occupied as Public Administrators but 
have as well a strong background in Information Technology e.g., Security Engineers, professionals in 
the IT Department of municipalities, System Administrators, etc. The distribution of participants was in 
majority males, however the difference with female participants is not so significant (31 out of 72 were 
female and 41 male). The most populated age-group was between 30-40 years (almost 57%) and 20% 
were from 40-50 years. Most participants have the age profile of an active working professional, which 
is also verified by the level of education, where the majority of participants, 19,44% and 63%, have 
undergraduate or postgraduate studies, respectively. 
From a technical perspective, the questions that capture the ease of use of the PLA management platform 
and the process of the management of a PLA outcome interesting results. The majority of the participants 
agrees that they can easily complete the process of a PLA management. In addition, this process is 
designed for all the various users, irrespective of their technical background. These two findings indicate 
that the PLA management platform is well-designed and does not require possession of specialised tech-
nical skills. Of course, there is always room for improvement. PLA management platform is a novel 
technical approach and requires continuous improvement to be approved by its end-users. Approaches 
facilitating the usability (Pattakou et al., 2018) of such framework should be always taken into 
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consideration at the early stages of their design. The question related to its integration and secure com-
munication with existing systems highlights the interoperability issues that every new system faces dur-
ing their integration with legacy systems. These difficulties have to be taken into account and individu-
ally examined for each system. The appropriate parameterisation of the IS should be taken into account, 
as well as the demanded effort and time for the successful completion of this process. 
Focusing on the usefulness and the impact that the adoption of the PLA has, the findings are rather 
positive. The PLA management platform is considered quite useful for providing innovative services to 
individuals, with respect to privacy. Moreover, the adoption of the PLA contributes to the improvement 
of privacy issues related to public services. Next, the percentage of respondents (51,39%) who indicate 
the increase of trust to public services provides us the confidence that the adoption of the PLA is actually 
beneficial for Public Administrators, who increase their trustworthiness, attracting thus more citizens to 
use their e-services. The last years, public sector has put a lot of effort to promote transparency (Obama, 
B., 2011), making their processes understandable, accurate, and reusable. PLA can contribute towards 
the improvement of public sector trustworthiness, and consequently, towards the increase of citizens’ 
trust. Finally, PLA offers the possibility of scalable provision of consent, allowing citizens to define 
their privacy preferences, which can be updated, if necessary. This attribute has been assessed positively 
by individuals, who, hereafter have realised the importance of their personal data. 
Healthcare domain This pilot includes 190 participants from two hospitals, 89 from OPBJ and 101 
from HIUNJ. Nearly half of the participants have a job as office worker while nearly 25% of users are 
freelancers. More specifically, 22,6% are freelances, 45,8% are office workers, 4,7% have retired, 10,5% 
are students, and 4,2% are unemployed. Cumulatively, there was a balance in the distribution of the 
respondents, since 48,40% were male and 51,60% female. 43,20% of the participants are between 30-
39 years old, percentage that again indicates their active working profile. However, there are significant 
percentages in higher ages (14,70% among 40-49 and 50-59, cumulatively), since the patients in these 
clinics are minors and are represented by their legal guardians. The participants’ educational level is 
mainly on bachelor’s degree (57,90%) and upper secondary (36,30%).  
Evaluating the management of the PLA from a technical point of view, we can see that the majority of 
the respondents find this process easy. Of course, this percentage should not be examined solely, but in 
combination with the high educational level of the majority of participants. The privacy analysis of an 
organisation’s IS is a demanding process that requires a substantial background of knowledge. However, 
our participants were not familiar with security and privacy engineering methodologies. This parameter 
indicates that the management platform is user-friendly and users who are not familiar with such tools 
and methodologies are able to use it successfully, delivering insight on privacy and security issues for 
their organisation.  
Regarding the usefulness of the PLA and the impact that it has on the individuals, the results are more 
than positive. Despite that participants were not aware of the privacy and security aspects of health data 
(the majority of them (almost 70%)), they mentioned that through their involvement of this process, they 
were able to deeply understand the importance of protecting the data they provide in such an organisa-
tion. Moreover, they feel confident that the hospital can guarantee greater privacy and security while 
exchanging health data. We highlight here that the healthcare domain pilot contains many peculiarities, 
such as the provision of not only personal but also sensitive data, the emergency cases that often demand 
quick responds and decisions, the necessity of cross-border exchange of patients’ data, and the repre-
sentation of the patients by their legal guardians, which also reflects the principle of GDPR related to 
the parental consent. Thus, it is quite meaningful that with the use of PLA, the patients have realised the 
criticality behind the provision of their personal and sensitive data or their biometrics. Another important 
benefit from the adoption of the PLA is that it is useful for patients with particular clinical needs or 
difficulties. One of the major benefits of an online healthcare service is to simplify some operations for 
patients living in remote areas or who face particular clinical difficulties that could benefit the most from 
the use of a web platform, and the PLA can contribute towards this. 
Natural persons, and specifically after the enforcement of the GDPR, have the right to be informed about 
the processing of the data they provide to public bodies. The inclusion, in the evaluation process, of a 
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Public Administration body shed light to the attention that must be given to interoperability issues that 
arise, when a new system needs to communicate with already existing ones. On the other hand, the 
inclusion of hospitals in the evaluation of the PLA revealed that special attention must be provided by 
the Data Controllers when they process special categories of personal data. Besides, the necessity for 
fortifying the communication channel when the data is cross-border transmitted, is imperative. This is 
an obligation that must be fulfilled by both organisations involved in this transmission. Results of this 
study also indicate that both these domains need the use of the proposed architecture as in both cases 
the clients/recipients of their services are positively inclined in use of such service that would increase 
the trustworthiness levels of a service. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper has presented a novel reference architecture for the management of Privacy Level Agree-
ments and a practical evaluation of this work. The evaluation has been conducted on the public admin-
istration domain and on the healthcare domain, where personal and special categories of personal data, 
i.e. sensitive ones, is being handled. Moreover, another peculiarity that these domains have is that indi-
viduals (i.e. citizens, patients) do not have other option than providing their personal data in order to 
deliver the corresponding e-services. However, it is fundamental right of the Data Subjects, when they 
provide their data to any organisation, to know who processes their data, if this data is being shared to 
other entities, and how long the organisation retains the data, if this goes beyond the obligatory by the 
legislation retention period.  
Additionally, the Data Controllers and the Data Processors are obliged to be compliant with the GDPR, 
when they process personal data. The proposed work, that provides as outcome the generation of the 
PLA, can be considered as a privacy-by-design supporting architecture, capturing the privacy prefer-
ences of the users and enforcing them to the corresponding personal data processing systems. 
The results of the evaluation indicate that appropriate management of PLAs allows Data Controllers 
(public bodies, private organisations) to demonstrate that they have taken all the necessary actions to 
mitigate the identified threats, and also to demonstrate transparency with regards to processing and shar-
ing of Data Subjects’ data. With respect to Article 32 of the GDPR, Data Controllers, with the use of 
the proposed tools described in the design time of this process, are able to demonstrate that they have 
implemented appropriate technical and organisational measures for ensuring a defined level of security. 
On the other hand, PLA is a means of enhancing trust of Data Subjects to Data Controllers, thus de-
creasing the number of users that are reluctant to use governmental and other public e-services. The 
information that the PLA includes can contribute to the satisfaction of the right to information of the 
Data Subjects (GDPR/Articles 13-14), and to the limitation of the requested data (data minimisation). 
The results of this work are useful for practitioners and researchers. At theoretical level, the process 
described in this work can be further extended to capture more concepts related with the satisfaction of 
the GDPR requirements, such as the satisfaction of additional rights of the Data Subjects, i.e. right of 
access, right to rectification, restriction of processing, right to object. From a practical perspective, future 
work can focus on the development of tools and methods to deal with aspects of the GDPR that PLAs 
are not supporting, such as privacy risks assessment, privacy complaints, and breach notifications. 
The presented work is part of a larger effort to develop a framework to support compliance with the 
GDPR. The ultimate goal is to finally make transparency and accountability inherent characteristics of 
all activities related to citizens’ data within Data Controllers. Monitoring how this data is used after it 
has been provided to the Data Controllers is also one of the main functionalities of this work. This, along 
with the enforcement of PLA, plays a critical role in the maximisation of transparency and accountabil-
ity, that is important specifically for the public administration for ensuring that services offered in this 
domain will gain users’ trust. 
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